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THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, ACTING LIKE A
LOBBYIST: SOME NOTES ON THE
PROCESS OF REVISING UCC ARTICLES
3 AND 4
Edward L. Rubin *
Because legal storytelling is now very much in vogue, it occurred to
me, in the midst of writing a different type of article for this Symposium,
that I too had a story to tell. My story does not concern my personal
feelings of oppression or marginalization, as is the current fashion.1
Rather, it involves my role as a minor participant in a legal event-the
drafting and adoption of revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. It thus connects with an older, somewhat milder tradition
of legal narrative,2 and with the social science technique of participant
observation.3
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); B.A., 1969,
Princeton University; J.D., 1979, Yale University.
1. See, eg., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DI-
ARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991); Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web:
Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989); Susan Estrich, Rape,
95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America:
Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE
L.J. 1329 (1991); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989). For explanatory accounts, see Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989);
and Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey
of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978); Philip G. Schrag, On Her Majesty's Secret
Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York City, 80 YALE L.J. 1529 (1971). With respect
to the topic of this Article, see Fairfax Leary, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 557
(1982); and Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Michael A. Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good News
from Articles Three and Four, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 611 (1982).
3. See generally GEORGE J. MCCALL & J. L. SIMMONS, ISSUES IN PARTICIPANT OBSER-
VATION (George J. McCall & J. L. Simmons, eds., 1969) (viewing participant observation as
style of research employed to seek analytic descriptions of complex social organizations and
delineating methodological and ethical issues that pertain to participant observation); Robert
W. Janes, A Note on Phases of the Community Role of the Participant Observer, 26 AM. Soc.
REV. 446 (1961) (describing use of participant-observation to research whether community
role of investigator affects statements made by local respondents); Morris S. Schwartz & Char-
lotte G. Schwartz, Problems in Participant Observation, 60 AM. J. Soc. 343 (1955) (analyzing
process of participant-observation as experienced in sociological study of mental hospital ward
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All stories should have an identified purpose, as several observers of
this style have noted;4 my story has two such purposes. First, it provides
a modest amount of legislative history for a statute that state legislatures
throughout the nation are considering, and that we will probably be liv-
ing with, in some form, for a considerable period of time. Information
about the way this statute was drafted may be of use to legislators decid-
ing whether to adopt it, to legislators deciding whether to amend it, now
or later, and to judges deciding how to interpret it. Second, the story
provides some insight into the general process of legislative design, par-
ticularly by expert committees. With the use of such committees on the
rise' and with a new federal statute authorizing agencies to draft regula-
tions through negotiation among private parties,6 the entire question of
legislative drafting by nongovernmental bodies merits serious attention.
I. THE ABA COMMITrEE
My involvement with the process of drafting the revisions to Arti-
cles 3 and 4 began in the spring of 1986, when I was asked to serve as
Chair of an American Bar Association subcommittee devoted to this is-
sue. The general committee was the Ad Hoc Committee on Payment
Systems, and consisted in its entirety of two subcommittees: mine, de-
voted to reviewing the Articles 3 and 4 revisions, and the subcommittee
on wire transfers, which was devoted to reviewing a proposed new article
of the UCC, designated Article 4A. The two subcommittees had an
overlapping membership and always met in tandem; the principal dis-
tinction between them was the identity of the chair.
and describing problems encountered in participant-observation when observer becomes in-
volved with observed).
4. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1012-51
(1991); Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV.
683, 703-16 (1992); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna V. Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming Apr. 1993).
5. See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 402-
14 (1981); Charles Dechert, Availability of Information for Congressional Operations, in CON-
GRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 167 (Alfred De Grazia ed., 1966). The trend
was dramatic enough to elicit a congressional effort to control it. See Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 979 (1988).
6. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process, 48 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 764 (1988); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise?, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1982); Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Beth Martin, FTC Rulemaking Through Negotiation, 61
N.C. L. REV. 275 (1983); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking in Practice, 5 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 482 (1986); Lawrence Susskind & Gerald McMahon, The Theory and
Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985). Here too, Congress felt
the need to control the process. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
648, 104 Stat. 4970 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-590 (Supp. II 1990)).
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I had not been involved with the drafting process in any way before
being asked to serve on the subcommittee. My participation was limited
to a role typical of legal academics: writing a long, rather complicated
article about the subject matter under consideration.7 This article,
coauthored with my colleague, Robert Cooter, applied economic analysis
to the problem of loss allocation in payment law, and concluded that this
law, particularly the UCC, should be more protective of consumers. It
helped me get tenure, but I have no vivid recollection of its having per-
suaded anyone. Consequently, I was flattered to be asked to serve as an
ABA chair-even the chair of a subsection of an ad hoc committee-and
it is with a twinge of regret that I now realize, for reasons to be described
below, that the ABA will never ask me to chair anything again.
When I accepted the position, I knew very little about the history of
the UCC revision project. I was aware that there had been something
called the 3-4-8 Committee, which had produced a proposed statute
known as the New Payments Code (NPC).8 I also was aware that both
the NPC and the committee had met an unfortunate end, and that the
current revision effort represented a second attempt to update the same
UCC provisions.' Upon reviewing the 3-4-8 Committee's ultimate draft,
however, I experienced a certain sense of unease. The draft, authored
largely by the committee's reporter, Hal Scott of Harvard Law School,
was a major intellectual achievement. It proposed uniform collection
and loss allocation rules for all the major modes of payment other than
currency-checks, credit cards and electronic fund transfers-and devel-
oped a uniform terminology to express these rules. There were some
problems with the draft, of course,'" but overall it seemed to me that
Scott had succeeded in achieving what Gilmore and Dunham had
achieved for security interests in the original UCC;" he had penetrated
through a welter of specific and contradictory statutes to perceive the
7. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer
Payments, 66 TEx. L. REv. 63 (1987).
8. Uniform New Payments Code (P.E.B. Draft No. 9, 1983).
9. There is no adequate written history of the NPC. For some partial accounts, see Ro-
land E. Brandel & Ann Geary, Electronic Fund Transfers and the New Payments Code, 37
Bus. LAW. 1065 (1982); Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus. LAW.
1215 (1984); and Deborah S. Prutzman, CHIPS and the Proposed Uniform New Payments
Code, 10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1983).
10. For analyses of the NPC, see Peter A. Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the True
Codification of Payments Law, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (1984); Marion W. Benfield, Jr., The
New Payments Code and the Abolition of Holder in Due Course Status as to Consumer Checks,
40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11 (1983); and Fairfax Leary, The Uniform New Payments Code:
The Essential Identity of "Pay" Orders and "Draw" Orders, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (1984).
11. See Peter F. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012,
1014-17 (1978).
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regularities of the underlying transactions, and the legal rules that were
necessary to facilitate them. It was unclear to me why the NPC had
failed, and what the conceptual and policy basis of the new effort would
be.
These questions were quickly answered during the course of the first
meeting of the ABA committee, held in Chicago on June 17, 1986. The
NPC, I learned, had attracted intense and widespread opposition from
the banking industry. In unifying payment law, the NPC had greatly
reduced the favorable treatment banks received under the rules in Arti-
cles 3 and 4 governing the checking system, and the industry reacted
with predictable and implacable fury. Consumer groups, which might
have been expected to oppose the banks, had apparently joined them in
opposition because the NPC proposed a reduction in the favorable treat-
ment consumers received under the federal statutes governing credit
cards and wire transfers.12 The result was an apparently grisly 1983
meeting in Williamsburg, Virginia, at which speaker after speaker rose to
excoriate the reporter, the existing draft and the whole concept of unify-
ing payment law. Two years later the sponsors of the UCC, the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALI) and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), terminated the entire project. 13
I also learned a bit, during the course of this first meeting, about the
new revision effort that had replaced the abortive NPC. The ALI, which
had taken the leading role in sponsoring the revision process, was now
feeling rather gun-shy and had yielded this role to the NCCUSL. That
august organization had reached an understanding with the banking in-
dustry after a series of meetings. A new revision process would be initi-
ated to modernize Articles 3 and 4 in light of changes in technology that
had occurred since the original UCC was promulgated in 1951. The re-
vision would not attempt to unify payment law; it would simply update
the existing Articles 3 and 4, and add one new article-designated 4A-
to govern wholesale wire transfers. It was further agreed that the new
revision would not alter the balance between banks and consumers that
existed in the original Articles 3 and 4, nor would it add any new provi-
sions dealing with consumer protection. Article 4A would scrupulously
avoid consumer transactions, which were governed by relatively pro-con-
sumer federal statutes, and focus exclusively on electronic fund transfers
12. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988); Electronic Fund Transfer Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988).
13. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1220-23.
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between business entities.14 To lead the drafting effort for this reconsti-
tuted project, two new reporters had been appointed-Robert Jordan
and William Warren of UCLA Law School.
The ABA Committee had been restructured to reflect the scope of
the new revision project, with one subcommittee (the one I chaired) de-
voted to Articles 3 and 4, and a second subcommittee (chaired by Wil-
liam Davenport, of First National Bank of Chicago) devoted to the new
Article 4A. The committee was asked, at its first meeting, to approve a
proposed name change from the Ad Hoc Committee on the New Pay-
ment Code to the Ad Hoc Committee on Payment Systems. 15 Its task
was to provide advice to the reporters and to the ALI-NCCUSL Drafting
Committee in general. Once the revision was complete, the committee
would also advise the ABA itself whether to endorse the final product.
We met three or four times a year, from June of 1986 through Au-
gust of 1990, after which I resigned my position as chair for reasons to be
described below. Invariably, one meeting was held at the ABA's annual
convention, which takes place in early August, and another was held at
the annual meeting of the ABA's Business Law Section, in March or
April. One or two other meetings unconnected with general ABA events
were also held at various locations around the country. These later meet-
ings typically lasted two full days, with one day devoted to my subcom-
mittee, and the second devoted to the subcommittee for Article 4A.
In theory, the meetings were open only to members of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Payment Systems, but any member of the ABA who was
interested in the subject matter could join the committee. The member-
ship list varied from about 60 to 110 people-with one sudden surge to
133, as will be explained below 16-- but attendance at each meeting usu-
ally ranged from 20 to 40. Most of these were "regulars," although there
were always a few people who emerged off the membership list for a
single meeting before vanishing from sight once more. Both the mem-
bers of the overall committee and the regular attendees at the two sub-
committee meetings were predominantly bank attorneys, corporate
attorneys who dealt with their firm's cash management operations, attor-
neys in private firms who represented banks or large corporations, and
14. See U.C.C. § 4A-108 (1990). The official comment states: "The effect of Section 4A-
108 is to make Article 4A and [The Electronic Fund Transfer Act] mutually exclusive." Id.
cmt.
15. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems, in Chicago, Ill. 2 (June 17, 1986) [hereinafter Minutes, June 17, 1986]
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
16. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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law professors.17 In addition, there usually were representatives from the
Federal Reserve System, the New York Clearinghouse and the American
Bankers Association.
The committee fulfilled its task of providing advice for the drafting
process by maintaining ongoing contacts with the ALI-NCCUSL Draft-
ing Committee. The reporters attended many, but not all of our sessions,
and seemed to pay serious attention to the views of the group when they
were present. Two members of the ABA committee who regularly at-
tended its meetings, Frederick Miller, a professor at the University of
Oklahoma, and Donald Rapson, Assistant General Counsel of the CIT
Group, Inc., were also members of the drafting committee; the two co-
chairs of the drafting committee, Robert Haydock and Carlyle Ring, oc-
casionally came to the ABA committee meetings. In addition, several
other members of our committee were apparently in regular contact with
the drafters. In the fall of 1990, our subcommittee produced its final
report, recommending ABA endorsement of the Article 3 and 4 revi-
sions, and the ABA House of Delegates approved the Article 3 and 4
revisions on February 12, 1991.
II. REPRESENTING THE CLIENT
Articles 3 and 4 codify bank practices regarding check collection, as
well as existing understandings about promissory notes, but their crucial
provisions-the ones that produce almost all the controversy-involve
the allocation of losses between banks and their customers. For a long
time, commentators on the UCC drafting process have expressed doubts
about the ALI and NCCUSL practice of relying on bank lawyers to draft
such provisions.1 8 The bank lawyers on the ABA committee had heard
17. On September 20, 1988, prior to the surge in membership, the Committee consisted of
the following:
Attorneys Employed by Banks and Other Financial Institutions 25
Attorneys Employed by Corporate Users 35




See Membership Roster of the Ad Hoe Committee on Payment Systems (Sept. 20, 1988) (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
18. See, e.g., Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform 17] Commercial Code Should Not
Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 362 (1952) (stating that Article 4 "is a deliberate sell-out of the
American Law Institute and the Commission of Uniform Laws to the bank lobby"); Grant
Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 374,
377 (1952) ("As Beutel says... Article 4... was proposed by a group of bank counsel ....
[A]s it now reads [it] should not be enacted, as part of the Code or in any other guise.").
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this criticism of course; when asked about it, they typically declared:
"When I participate in an advisory committee, I check my clients at the
door." This was true; with the exception of Thomas Baxter, who explic-
itly and effectively represented the concerns of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem,' 9 none of the attorneys on the committee defended the particular
interests of the bank for which they worked, or which retained them.
What these attorneys did not check at the door, however, was their con-
ceptual framework. Contemporary philosophers and anthropologists as-
sure us that doing so would be impossible,20 and even efforts to imagine
doing so, like Rawls' A Theory of Justice,21 have been subjected to intense
criticism.2" In any event, the bank attorneys who participated in the
ABA committees certainly had their conceptual frameworks in the room
with them. Part of this conceptual framework was the product of being
white, male and upper-middle class, as virtually all these attorneys were.
Indeed, the very image of checking one's clients at the door would occur
most readily to someone who frequents restaurants with coat check facil-
ities; I generally wind up at McDonalds, where I try to keep my posses-
sions really close to me. Beyond their lack of diversity, the bank
attorneys on the committee tended to see the world from the perspective
of their clients. To them, banks are reputable, well-run institutions,
struggling to make a decent profit in an economy buffeted by recession, a
political environment that imposes unnecessarily stringent and detailed
regulations and a world of intense, ever-increasing competition. Con-
sumers who make claims against banks, on the other hand, tend to be
careless, mistaken or dishonest. They are not bad people, but when they
Similar criticisms were voiced about Article 4's direct antecedent, the Bank Collection Code.
See U.C.C. § 4-101 cmt. (1987) (superseded by U.C.C. § 4-101 cmt. (1990)); Robert T. Don-
ley, Some Problems in the Collection of Checks, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 195 (1932); Roscoe T. Steffen,
The Check Collection Muddle, 10 TUL. L. REv. 537 (1936); Wayne L. Townsend, The Bank
Collection Code of the American Bankers'Association (pts. 1-3), 8 TUL. L. REv. 21, 236, 376
(1933-1934).
19. Because it is essentially the regulator of the check collection system, the Fed has a
direct institutional interest in the rules governing that system. Moreover, as will be described
below, it has the power to preempt any rules that it deems undesirable. In addition to Baxter,
Fed officials who attended some of the committee meetings included David Felsenthal, Oliver
Ireland and Ernest Patrikis.
20. See, eg., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCI-
ENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD (1975); CLIFFORD GEERTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); JORGEN
HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy Shapiro trans., 1971).
21. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-92 (1971) (discussing philosophical inter-
pretation of "initial situation" or "original position" regarding concepts of justice).
22. See, e.g., SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
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lose money, their natural tendency is to blame the bank, or if they know
they were at fault, distort the facts so that the bank will take the loss.
One example of this perspective involved the committee's treatment
of stop payment orders. The original Article 4 declared that the cus-
tomer has the "right" to stop payment on a check-one of the very few
affirmative rights that this statute extends to customers.23 But it went on
to provide that "[t]he burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss
resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop pay-
ment order is on the customer.""4 As I and several other members of the
committee pointed out rather early in our meetings, and as the reporters
were well aware, this burden-of-proof requirement is problematic.25
First, it grants a procedural advantage to the party that clearly made the
mistake. Second, and more basically, the entire point of the stop pay-
ment mechanism is to shift the "burden of establishing the fact and
amount" of a commercial loss from the customer to the merchant; it
provides the ordinary buyer with a self-help remedy and requires the
merchant to proceed with litigation. If the bank makes an error, how-
ever, the customer loses this advantage because the bank is entitled to
debit the account until the customer demonstrates, to the bank or a
court, the fact and the amount of the loss.
In response to these perceived difficulties, the reporters drafted a
new stop payment provision. It read as follows:
(3) If a bank pays an item contrary to a binding stop payment
order, it shall promptly recredit the customer's account for the
amount of the item unless the customer refuses to sign upon
request by the bank (i) an affidavit setting out facts sufficient to
establish a prima facie defense on the item, and (ii) an agree-
ment in writing to cooperate with the bank in its action against
the person who received payment to establish the bank's subro-
gation rights under Section 4-407.26
23. U.C.C. § 4-403. Articles 3 and 4 will be cited as either "Original" or "Revised."
"Original" refers to the 1951 version of the Code; "Revised" refers to the 1990 version. In this
case, the relevant language is identical in the two versions.
24. U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (Original).
25. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems, in St. Louis, Mo. (Apr. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Minutes, Apr. 10, 1987]
(summarizing discussion of stop payment orders) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
26. U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (Tent. Draft July 31-Aug. 7, 1987). All drafts cited in this Article
are typewritten documents prepared by the NCCUSL, and are on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review. The date given is the one that appears on the title page and generally
refers to the NCCUSL meeting at which the particular draft was presented.
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The provision, Warren and Jordan felt, preserved the benefit of the stop
payment order for the customer, yet provided the bank with sufficient
information so that, having paid the check from its own funds, it could
proceed against the merchant.
At the first meeting where this new provision was discussed,27 a con-
sumer representative-Gail Hillebrand of Consumers Union-was pres-
ent." She found the provision an improvement, but observed that many
consumers would be intimidated by being required to'sign a legal docu-
ment. They would assume that they were admitting liability rather than
giving the bank legal rights against the merchant, or they would experi-
ence a vague, less-defined discomfort about potential involvement in legal
proceedings. The bank attorneys at the meeting were quiescent, perhaps
because they were seeing the provision for the first time. I assumed that
we had taken a small step toward more balanced legislation.
By the next meeting, however, these attorneys had an answer.29
First, they argued, many people who stop checks do so dishonestly or as
a result of a mistaken belief about their legal rights; banks should not be
held liable for paying checks that should have been paid anyway. More
importantly, the bank attorneys said there was no need for a legal rule
requiring banks to recredit the customer's account because that was stan-
dard practice anyway. When the customer complained that the bank
had paid the check over a valid stop order, the bank would ask the cus-
tomer about the circumstances of the stop. In cases in which the bank
perceived that the customer had a valid reason to stop the check, it
would voluntarily recredit the account and either accept the loss or pro-
ceed against the merchant. To codify this practice would only deny
banks the flexibility they needed in these situations.
As these arguments were advanced, most of the people in the room
nodded in agreement. Gail Hillebrand was unable to attend. Sensing
that a blazing condemnation of the ways banks treated ordinary consum-
ers would not be well received, I tried a different argument: If banks
were already acting so responsibly, they could have no objection to the
27. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoe Committee
on Payment Systems, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Minutes, Sept. 26, 1987] (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
28. For the circumstances of Hillebrand's participation, see infra notes 57-58 and accom-
panying text.
29. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems, in L.A., Cal. 9-10 (Oct. 29, 1988) [hereinafter Minutes, Oct. 29, 1988]
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Arti-
cles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoe Committee on Payment Systems, in San Diego, Cal. (June 17,
1988) [hereinafter Minutes, June 17, 1988] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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codification of their already excellent practices in law. This law would
discipline the outliers, those irresponsible institutions that diverged from
standard practice when subject to financial stress. Surely, there were
some such institutions; because we all knew that certain savings and
loans (one can always dump on S&Ls when talking to attorneys for com-
mercial banks) were willing to commit outright crimes, they would cer-
tainly be prepared to treat consumers as harshly as the law allowed. I
even received support from one of the bank attorneys, David Goldstein
of Seattle, who urged his colleagues to be "statesmanlike" on this issue.
But most of the committee members did not perceive erroneous payment
of stop orders as a particularly serious problem, and felt that a complex
legal rule would interfere with the flexibility required by our well-
managed, consumer-oriented banking system. William Warren, one of
the reporters, was present, and I am sure the same views were expressed
in the drafting committee. The result, as Warren announced at a later
ABA committee meeting, was that the proposed change was withdrawn,
and Article 4's stop payment provision was restored to its original
form. 30
Had consumer representatives been in the room, I am certain they
would have found the bank attorneys' picture of banks and consumers
somewhat fanciful. Consumers, they would have said, are generally hon-
est; fraud losses on checking accounts, for example, are extremely low
and virtually all of these losses are attributable to real criminals, not er-
rant consumers. Banks, on the other hand, are rarely solicitous of indi-
vidual consumers, and they are reluctant to absorb losses or forgo profits
when the hapless consumer can be made to pay. In addition, they are
inefficient, regularly committing errors whose consequences they are un-
willing to accept.
There is very little empirical evidence available about these matters,
certainly not enough to support or refute either set of images. The bank
attorneys' reflexive belief in the trustworthiness of banks and the irre-
sponsibility of customers springs from a characteristic way that lawyers
think. Lawyers cathect with their clients.3 They do not think of them-
30. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems, in Houston, Tex. 10 (Mar. 4, 1989) [hereinafter Minutes, Mar. 4, 1989]
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
31. See, eg., MARK J. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT: THE UNSEEN POWER OF
WASHINGTON LAWYERS 271-93 (rev. ed. 1978); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH
POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); Erwin Chemer-
insky, Protecting Lawyers from Their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer's Role, 5 J. LEGAL
PROF. 31 (1980); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 77 (1993).
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selves as hired guns, mercenaries, trained barracudas or any of the other
bellicose figures that their critics depict. Instead, they see themselves as
helping people carry out desirable activities or enforce their legal rights.
This is true even for general litigators who switch from plaintiff to de-
fendant, buyer to seller, borrower to lender, new entrant to dominant
firm with each case, yet always seem to be convinced that the client who
walked in the door and retained them should prevail. It is all the more
true for corporate attorneys who work within a single industry, or spe-
cialized litigators who always represent one side. When that single in-
dustry consists of people whose social class and economic status are the
same as the attorney's, bonds of friendship will be added to the process of
client identification. Over time, these forces generate a conceptual frame-
work, a general orientation toward the world. It is possible for lawyers
to check their clients at the door-attorneys in law firms switch clients
fairly regularly, and in-house lawyers can always imagine moving to a
different company within the industry. What they cannot leave behind
them is a set of identifications, beliefs and personal bonds built up over
decades of practice. These identifications, beliefs and bonds constitute
their career, their sense of themselves as productive members of society,
and form a comprehensive framework through which lawyers perceive
the issues in their field.
Of course, this process of identification varies in intensity. It will be
attenuated, perhaps to the vanishing point, when there is a large differ-
ence in social status between the lawyer and the client. For a public
defender, representing a client who is of a different race, uneducated,
poor or lower-middle class, and accused of doing something that the law-
yer cannot possibly imagine having done, there may be no sense of identi-
fication at all. In fact, public defenders often acknowledge that they
represent the guilty, a realization that may be responsible for their high
rate of job dissatisfaction.32 But most people integrate their lives, con-
structing a belief system that provides them with a sense of meaning for
the things they do. For an attorney, this process involves identifying
with one's client group and ultimately developing a conceptual frame-
work that incorporates and justifies these clients' points of view.
The force of this identification process was apparent throughout the
ABA committee meetings. While the discussion of stop orders was one
32. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 89-90 (1979); Randy Bellows, Notes of a Public De-
fender, in P. HEYMAN & L. LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS 69
(1988); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's "Different Mission'" Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).
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of the most dramatic examples, a much more important instance in-
volved truncation. Under existing check collection systems, the check
itself traces a commercial circle from the drawer to the payee, to the
depositary bank, the intermediary bank, the drawee or payor bank and,
as a canceled check, back to the drawer. With truncation, the physical
check is cut off at some point and its journey is completed by electronic
transmission of the information it contains.33 Simple truncation stops
the check at the payor bank, so that the customer receives a statement
with a list of charges but no canceled checks.34 Nothing in the current
UCC prevents this practice, but it does not reduce collection costs to any
significant extent. Radical truncation stops the check at the depositary
bank and transmits nothing but electronic information through the col-
lection process.35 This represents a major cost reduction. It is already
the way credit card charges are collected, and it probably represents the
future of the checking system.36 Because of their eighteenth century ori-
gins, existing Articles 3 and 4 contemplate paper collection and contain a
variety of legal rules that preclude radical truncation. The banks' desire
to remove these legal impediments to truncation was probably their pri-
mary motivation for favoring revision of the UCC.
While truncation benefits bank customers by lowering collection
costs, it also presents difficulties for them. Instead of receiving their can-
celed checks each month, customers will receive information. The first
problem involves the amount of information they receive. The absolute
minimum is the item number and the amount of the check; the maximum
that can be transmitted electronically is an image of the check, which is
what the American Express Company provides for credit card charges.
Mastercard and Visa adopt the intermediate position by providing the
item number and amount plus the name of the payee and the date of the
transaction. Obviously, the more information one receives, the easier it is
33. DONALD BAKER & ROLAND BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
SYSTEMS 2.02[1] (2d ed. 1988).
34. Id.
35. Edward L. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision ofArticles 3 and 4 of the
UCC, 43 Bus. LAW. 621, 633 (1988).
36. See generally BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 33, $t 2.01-.02 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp.
No. 2 1992) (discussing electronic processing of paper checks and role of truncation in collec-
tion process); ALLEN LiPIs ET AL., ELECTRONIC BANKING 91-102 (1985) (discussing role of
truncation in collection process); Rubin, supra note 35, at 632-38 (discussing various proce-
dural and substantive changes in UCC revisions to accomodate truncation of collection
processes). In their initial memorandum describing their analysis of their assignment, Warren
and Jordan listed truncation as a leading issue. Memorandum from William D. Warren &
Robert L. Jordan, Reporters, to the Committee on Articles 3 and 4 and Wire Transfers 1 (Dec.
17, 1985) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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to reconcile one's account, maintain records and detect bank errors or
fraudulent items. The second problem with any truncation system is that
the actual check is often necessary, and almost always useful, for disputes
with payees, the Internal Revenue Service or various other parties.
When such disputes arise, the customer will need to retrieve the check,
or at least obtain a complete copy of it.
The draft versions of the Articles 3 and 4 revisions responded to the
banks' desire to facilitate truncation-by providing that an item, that is,
the thing that moves through the collection system, could consist of elec-
tronic information as well as a physical check.37 However, they did not
deal with any of the potential problems that truncation might cause the
customer. To fulfill their obligation to the customer, banks were only
required to transmit the minimum amount of information-item number
and amount, plus the date the item was paid by the payee bank.31 While
the drafts did state that the customer was entitled to the original check,
or a copy of it, on request, they did not contain any rules governing the
amount the bank could charge for retrieval, the length of time permitted
for retrieval or the customer's remedy if the bank was unable or unwill-
ing to produce the item.
In the ABA committee, the task of pointing out the potential diffi-
culties that these provisions would create for ordinary consumers fell
largely to the law professors;39 I recall being particularly vociferous
about the subject. We suggested that consumers might be bewildered by
a list of numbers, and that a fair truncation system should impose some
obligation on the banks to supply consumers with the information they
would need by requiring that banks report the name of payee, or provide
"carbonized" checks, or use some other mechanism.' In addition, we
thought that banks should be required to provide a copy of the actual
item, or the item itself, within a defined period of time and at a reason-
37. U.C.C. § 4-110 (Revised). This provision went through a succession of variations
from one draft to the next. The main reason for the changes was the banks' concern that the
provision impose as few constraints on them as possible, thereby allowing for maximum
flexibility.
38. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (Revised). The date of payment is, of course, easy for the bank to
supply. Unlike the date on the instrument, or the date of deposit, it will rarely be of much use
to the customer.
39. See Minutes, Mar. 4, 1989, supra note 30; Summary of Proceedings, Subcommittee on
Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoe Committee on Payment Systems, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 26, 1987)
[hereinafter Summary of Proceedings, Sept. 26, 1987] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review); Minutes, Apr. 10, 1987, supra note 25; Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Arti-
cles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoe Committee on Payment Systems, in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 7, 1986)
[hereinafter Minutes, Nov. 7, 1986] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Minutes,
June 17, 1986, supra note 15.
40. Minutes, Nov. 7, 1986, supra note 39, at 1-2.
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able cost, because a customer's bank had no particular incentive to re-
trieve the item from some remote location and the consumer would be in
a very poor bargaining position at the time of the request. 41 I also
thought that a balanced statute should impose a penalty on banks that
failed to produce a requested item and that the formula that has proven
to be effective in the Truth in Lending Act, a liquidated sum plus attor-
ney's fees, would be appropriate.42
Each time these points were raised, most of the other committee
members reacted as if a faux pas had been committed. There was a slight
rustling of people in their seats and a few sidelong glances; then one of
the bank attorneys, with the most subtle suggestion of a sigh, would un-
dertake to explain to me why the suggested changes were unnecessary.
In the first place, he would say, truncation is a new idea, and we should
not encumber it with rules whose effects cannot be anticipated. Requir-
ing banks to provide the name of the payee would involve massive rede-
sign of the banks' automatic processing equipment and thus delay, if not
prevent, the advent of truncation. As for rules and sanctions governing
check retrieval, these are entirely unnecessary; banks need customers and
have no desire to ignore their legitimate requests. Requiring the payor
bank to obtain items within a specified period of time, under threat of
civil liability, is unreasonable because that bank would not have control
of the check. All that such a requirement would achieve would be to
create another impediment to truncated check collection. At the conclu-
sion of this statement, usually delivered in parts by several different peo-
ple, there was a general nodding of heads and an unspoken air of "let's
proceed."
At work in these discussions, particularly with respect to the re-
trieval issue, was the same sense that banks were trustworthy, reliable
institutions that would do their best to serve their customers. As previ-
ously mentioned, these beliefs derive from the well-recognized tendency
of lawyers to identify with their clients, a tendency that becomes greatly
amplified when all the lawyers' clients are members of the same industry
and the issue involves an identification with that industry. The commit-
tee members' treatment of the information issue revealed a deeper, if
more diffuse aspect of this identification process. The bank attorneys not
only identified with their clients, in the sense of believing, as advocates or
representatives, that their clients were right, but they also tended to per-
ceive the underlying structure of the situation in the way their clients did.
These attorneys responded genuinely and instinctively to the concern
41. Id. at 3.
42. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a), 1693m(a) (1988).
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that providing customers with the name of the payee would involve sig-
nificant expenses for banks. They could feel the distress their clients
would experience if compelled to replace or reconfigure all their auto-
matic processing equipment.43 In contrast, the plight ordinary consum-
ers confronted with a list of otherwise unidentified numbers simply left
them cold.
Most consumer representatives would have reacted exactly the op-
posite way, of course. Concerned that banks are earning substantial, per-
haps excessive profits at their customers' expense, they would have been
unmoved by the banks' need to alter the processing equipment in order
to reduce collection costs. On the other hand, they would have readily
identified with the difficulties that ordinary consumers will face from the
severe reduction in the information that is supplied in a truncated sys-
tem. Their basic allegiance as representatives, like the allegiance of bank
attorneys, not only governs their judgments about appropriate solutions
but determines their underlying perception of the problem to be solved.
Another discussion in the ABA committee highlights this phenome-
non-the discussion about "bounced," or not sufficient funds (NSF)
checks. The issue arose in the very first meeting when the chair of the
committee, Roland Brandel, pointed out that existing Article 4 does not
specify the criteria for wrongful dishonor of a check.' Most banks post
checks against the customer's account at night. The question was
whether a bank officer, when reviewing NSF checks the next morning,
must recheck the account to see if additional funds had been received
that morning. Brandel's idea was that the officer would not be required
43. At present, all the information that revised Article 4 requires is encoded in Magnetic
Ink Character Recognition (MICR) numbers on the bottom of the check (the payor bank,
account number and item number are pre-encoded; the amount is encoded by the depository
bank). Encoding the payee's name or the date of the check would require more MICR figures,
and the machinery is not designed to handle any increase. In addition, the payee's name might
be difficult to read and encode.
The answer, of course, is that an innovation is not technologically ready for the market
until it can be produced with the necessary safeguards. Airplanes were fairly common in 1910,
and were a factor in World War I, but they were not technologically ready for the civilian
passenger market until a decade later. In fact, the technological developments necessary to
provide customers with a picture of their truncated check are close to completion. See Karen
Gullo, Unisys, BancTec Adding Check-Imaging Feature, AM. BANKER, Oct. 25, 1990, at 3;
Jeanne lida, Fed Tests High-Speed Imaging, AM. BANKER, June 14, 1990, at 3; Richard
Layne, Bankers Say IBM Ready to Test Imaging System, AM. BANKER, Mar. 9, 1990, at 1. If
the banks are required to internalize all the costs of a technological change, they will make
efficient judgments about the implementation of that change. Cf Cooter & Rubin, supra note
7, at 76-77 (discussing application of loss reduction principle to participants in payment
system).
44. Minutes, June 17, 1986, supra note 15, at 4.
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to recheck, but if the officer did, the bank would be required to revise the
account balance to reflect the newly deposited funds. The committee dis-
cussed the idea at several meetings, and a provision to this effect was
ultimately added to Article 4, I believe as a result of these discussions.45
There is nothing unreasonable about this provision, although some-
one more sympathetic to customers' rights might have designed it differ-
ently. What is striking, however, is that this is the only provision
regarding NSF checks that the committee approved. Bounced checks
have been a matter of significant controversy in recent years.46 In re-
sponse to this controversy, the Federal Reserve Board proposed a regula-
tion that would have given banks an additional day to decide whether to
pay or bounce checks under $100. 4 7 The theory of this provision was
that many customers bounce checks because they miscalculate their bal-
ance at the end of their pay period. The extra day would allow a signifi-
cant proportion of the bounced checks to be paid, thus saving customers
substantial bounced-check fees, and saving money for the payment sys-
tem generally. The reporters suggested a similar provision in their early
drafts, substituting the more flexible term "small" for the fixed dollar
amount.48 But the ABA committee reacted negatively to this idea on the
grounds that it would create operational difficulties for the bank. Specifi-
cally, the concern was that if a small check were reprocessed the second
day, there would be no convenient way for the bank's automatic machin-
ery to know that this was a second presentation rather than an initial
one, and thus no way to determine that the check should then be
45. I ; Minutes, Nov. 7, 1986, supra note 39, at 2-3; see Memorandum from Robert Jor-
dan & William Warren, Reporters, to Drafting Committee on Amendments to Uniform Com-
mercial Code-Current Payment Methods (Aug. 6, 1986) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review). The memorandum states: "At the June meeting of the ABA Committee, Ro-
land Brandel raised the issue of when a payor bank may determine that a customer's balance is
insufficient." Id. at 67. It then reprints language submitted by Brandel, which is in fact the
first version of revised U.C.C. § 4-402(c). Id.
46. See, eg., Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr.
345, appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (involving class action challenging validity of bank
charges assessed for NSF checks drawn on commercial accounts); EDWARD L. RUBIN & ROB-
ERT D. COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM 132-42 (1989).
47. 52 Fed. Reg. 47,120 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 229) (proposed Dec. 11,
1987).
48. U.C.C. § 4-108(1) (Proposed Draft July 31-Aug. 7, 1987).
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bounced if no additional funds had been received. 9 In response to this
concern, the provision was ultimately dropped from the revision."
Other ways of reducing the number of bounced checks, such as re-
quiring banks to pay small checks prior to large ones, 51 as well as the
central question of the amount of bounced-check charges, were never se-
riously considered by the committee. These issues are perhaps the great-
est concerns about the checking system that consumer representatives
express. According to some estimates, the banking industry annually
clears between three and four billion dollars from return-check charges.52
But banks do not regard this as a problem, and the committee members
shared their perception.
III. DEALING WITH THE OPPOSITION
Although lawyers tend to identify with their clients, and almost al-
ways identify with an industry to which all their clients belong, they
often must deal with those who hold opposing views. The more amicable
the transaction, after all, the less the parties will need to involve attor-
neys. As a general matter, the lawyer's role is embedded in the context
of the adversary system, in which each side is represented by a lawyer
committed to its cause and the resolution emerges from the controlled
conflict between the two. Indeed, the prevailing justification for author-
izing lawyers to represent any client who cares to retain them, without
examining the morality of the client's position, is our faith that this ad-
versarial clash of represented parties will produce just results.53
But in the ABA Committee and, as far as I could tell, in the ALI-
NCCUSL Drafting Committee,5 4 only two of the three-principal inter-
49. See Minutes, Oct. 29, 1988, supra note 29, at 7; Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on
Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoe Committee on Payment Systems, in Phila., Pa. 3-4 (Mar. 26,
1988) [hereinafter Minutes, Mar. 26, 1988] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review);
Minutes, Sept. 26, 1987, supra note 27, at 5-6; Minutes, Nov. 7, 1986, supra note 39, at 2-3.
50. Banks persuaded the Federal Reserve System to drop its provision on the same
grounds. See 53 Fed. Reg. 19,379 (1988).
51. If the customer's balance is $1000, and four checks in amounts of $200, $200, $300 and
$900 are presented, the bank can bounce either one check or three, depending on the order of
payment. The original Article 4, in U.C.C. § 4-303(2), states: "[Iltems may be... paid.., in
any order convenient to the bank." U.C.C. § 4-303(2) (Original). In the revision, the provi-
sion reads: "[I]tems may be ... paid ... in any order." Id. § 4-303(b) (Revised).
52. See 133 CONG. REC. H3073 (daily ed. May 5, 1987) (statement of Rep. St. Germain).
53. See, e.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVISORY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DE-
FENSE (1984); Malcolm Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERI-
CAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 753 (Robert J. Janosik ed., 1987).
54. The drafting committee, as listed on the various drafts of the revisions, consisted (in-
cluding reporters and ex officio members) of seven law professors, three corporate attorneys,
three attorneys in private practice and one judge. The committee received advice from a larger
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ests-financial institutions, corporate users and consumers-were repre-
sented. Apart from bank attorneys and corporate attorneys of various
sorts, the only significant group consisted of commercial law professors,
five or six of whom were regular attendees. They were quite knowledgea-
ble about the law, though no more so than many of the bank and corpo-
rate attorneys, but they had very little impact on the overall tone of the
meetings. To begin with, they held diverse views, ranging from those
who focused on consumer issues, such as Mark Budnitz" and myself, to
those who strongly supported the revision process, such as Fred Miller.5 6
More significantly, however, they seemed to lack authority as far as the
other members were concerned because they represented no one other
than themselves. The bank attorneys could claim, however subtly, the
support of the industry, as well as a superior knowledge of bank opera-
tions; the corporate attorneys could speak with the authority of major
group of advisors, whose names are listed in the prefatory note to Article 3. This note, which
accompanied the promulgated version of Articles 3 and 4, was written by Carlyle C. Ring,
President of the NCCUSL. While it appears without attribution of authority, a virtually iden-
tical document, indicating Ring as the author, was submitted to several state legislatures dur-
ing the controversy over adoption of the revisions. This note will be cited hereinafter as
revised Article 3 prefatory note (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
The note, a somewhat defensive document, states that: "The consensus, balance and
quality achieved in this lengthy deliberative process [of drafting the revisions] is a product...
[of] the faithful and energetic participation of the advisors and participants in the drafting
meetings." Revised Article 3 prefatory note. It then goes on to list the advisors and "other
participants," consisting of:
13 Attorneys for Banks and Other Financial Institutions
8 Attorneys for Large Corporations
7 Attorneys in Larger Firms
4 representing banks
3 representing large corporations
4 Members of Trade Associations for Financial Institutions
4 Staff Members of the Federal Reserve System
2 Representatives of the New York Clearing House
1 Law Professor
See revised Article 3 prefatory note (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
There is no representative of consumer groups, or for that matter, of small businesses. It
should be noted, given the tone of the document, that this was clearly the most balanced list
that Ring could compile.
55. For a reflection of Budnitz's views, see Mark E. Budnitz, The Consequences of Bulk in
Our Banking Diet: Bulk Filing of Checks and the Bank's Duty of Ordinary Care Under the
1990 Revision to the Uniform Commercial Code When It Honors Forged Checks, 63 TEMP.
L.Q. 729 (1990); and Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4: A Process
Which Excluded Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L. REv. 827
(1992).
56. For a reflection of Miller's views, see Fred H. Miller, Is Karl's Kode Kaput?, 26 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 703 (1993); and Fred H. Miller, U C. C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process
and Scope, 42 ALA. L. REv. 405 (1991).
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nonfinancial enterprises. Because both subcommittees usually operated
by consensus, rather than by vote, this rendered the influence of the
professors even less than their relatively meager numbers would suggest.
The obvious counterweight to all these bank and corporate attor-
neys would have been some representatives from the consumer move-
ment. As indicated, these representatives could have been expected to
express exactly opposite beliefs about the relative trustworthiness of
banks and consumers, beliefs based upon their underlying perception of
the world. Like the bank attorneys, they would have expressed their
views with a relatively high degree of unanimity, and with the political
force of their organizations. Their presence might have generated an ad-
versary dynamic leading to a balanced statute, just as the clash between
two represented parties in a court of law is expected to produce a just
result.
No consumer representatives were part of the Ad Hoe Committee
when it was established; however, none were invited, as far as I know,
and none volunteered. Fairly early in the course of our meetings, the
chair of the committee, Roland Brandel, noted this deficiency and invited
Gail Hillebrand of Consumers Union to join.5 7 Hillebrand attended sev-
eral meetings; she spoke out on the stop payment issue 8 and ultimately
wrote a strong statement opposing the revisions, which is described be-
low. But Hillebrand's participation was constrained by a lack of funding
and a lack of time. The bank and corporate attorneys generally had their
travel and daily living expenses paid by their bank or firm; the law
professors were sometimes reimbursed by their institution or in my case,
because I was the chair, by the ABA itself. Hillebrand had no funding,
and thus was able to attend only those meetings held near her home in
the San Francisco area. In addition, Consumers Union is understaffed,
with only four attorneys in the San Francisco office and only eleven
nation-wide. In addition to payment law, Hillebrand had to cover all
other UCC topics, the Community Reinvestment Act, 9 home mort-
gages, unfair debt collection practices, consumer credit, Truth in Lend-
ing' and abuses involving raw milk. This would have created difficulties
if dealing with an ordinary statute; it presented particular difficulties with
respect to Articles 3 and 4, which are arcane and technical, and which
57. Later on, another member of the committee, David Goldstein, urged the ABA to se-
cure consumer representation on relevant committees. Letter from David B. Goldstein, Mem-
ber, ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Payment Systems, to Robert D. Raven, President, American
Bar Association 2-3 (Feb. 6, 1989) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
58. See Minutes, Sept. 26, 1987, supra note 27, at 8.
59. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1988).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988).
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demand, as commercial law professors and their students know, long pe-
riods of unrewarding study.
In order to secure adequate representation of consumer interests on
the committee, the ABA would have needed to pay the expenses of sev-
eral consumer representatives, committing the funds in a sufficiently de-
finitive manner so that the organizations would be willing to assign
significant staff time to the project. The ALI and NCCUSL would have
needed to do the same thing for their drafting committee. There are sev-
eral possible reasons why none of these organizations even contemplated
doing so. First, they may have believed that knowledgeable attorneys, no
matter what their institutional affiliations, were capable of drafting a bal-
anced, public-oriented statute. This was a mistaken notion,61 and all
three organizations should have realized this, given the widely known
events surrounding the original Articles 3 and 4, their predecessor stat-
utes, and the abortive New Payments Code.62 A second possibility is
that all three organizations were willing, or even eager, to produce legis-
lation that catered to the interests of banks at the expense of their cus-
tomers. The final possibility is that none of these organizations had the
money to subsidize consumer representatives or, more precisely, that
none of them were willing to devote a significant amount of funds to an
obscure and sexless topic like payments. My own guess is that all three
factors were involved.
The Article 4A subcommittee supplied an illuminating example of
the dynamic that might have occurred had consumer representatives
been included in the meetings. As a result of the New Payments Code
fiasco, the Article 4A project, which dealt with wire transfers, was specif-
ically designed to exclude consumer transactions. 63 But it did cover the
transactions of commercial firms, and these firms had the capacity to
strike rather hard once they were aroused. What aroused them was the
drafting committee's approach to the mysterious interloper problem.
The problem, which is extremely simple, but derives drama from the size
and speed of wire transfers, is this: At some particular time, there is
$100 million in a corporate account; ten nanoseconds later, there is $20
million, and no one knows what happened to the other $80 million.
What distinguishes this problem from many other issues of loss allo-
cation in payment law is that, by hypothesis, there is no way to deter-
61. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
62. See Nan S. Elfis & Steven B. Dow, Banks and Their Customers Under the Revisions to
Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4: Allocation of Losses Resulting from Forged Draw-
ers'Signatures, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 57, 77 & n.107 (1991).
63. See U.C.C. § 4A-108.
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mine which party was at fault or, indeed, the means by which the loss
occurred. Nonetheless, the drafting committee, with the help of its advi-
sors and the ABA committee, was readily able to develop a satisfactory
solution. It provided that the bank was required to offer the customer a
"commercially reasonable" security procedure for wire transfers. If the
customer accepted the procedure, and the bank then failed to follow it,
the bank would be responsible for the resulting loss. If the customer
refused to accept the bank's security procedure, or if the customer failed
to follow that procedure, the customer was liable. If neither party could
prove that the other was at fault-the mysterious interloper problem-
the customer was liable." This is because customers as a group are likely
to be less responsible about payment matters than banks.
Virtually all large corporations have a group of high level employ-
ees, including at least one attorney, assigned to managing the corpora-
tion's liquid funds. These cash managers, like virtually everyone else in
American business, belong to a trade association, known at that time as
the National Corporate Cash Managers Association (NCCMA).65 When
the NCCMA found out about the Article 4A drafting project, and specif-
ically about the proposed treatment of fraudulent wire transfers, it sent
Arthur Herold, an attorney from Philadelphia, to the March 26, 1988
meeting to express the organization's displeasure. 6  Simultaneously,
members of the NCCMA who were attorneys began enlisting in our Ad
Hoc Committee on Payment Systems, which quickly increased in size
from about 80 to 133 people. 67 These corporate attorneys appeared in
force at the next meeting of the two subcommittees. At least fourteen of
them were present at the Article 4A subcommittee meeting, representing
institutions such as Amoco, Exxon, Atlantic Richfield, Sears Roebuck,
Beatrice/Hunt Wesson, Allstate and Dow Chemical.6"
When the subcommittee reached the problem of the fraudulent wire
transfers, and specifically the mysterious interloper problem, a new mood
seemed to be present. According to approximately fourteen members of
64. See U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to -205 (Tent. Draft, 1987).
65. Other members of the organization include treasury managers, banks, consultants and
vendors. The NCCMA has since changed its name to the Treasury Management Association
(TMA) in an effort to broaden the association's focus and areas of expertise. NCCMA, CORP.
EFT REP., Oct. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
66. Minutes, Mar. 26, 1988, supra note 49.
67. See Roland E. Brandel, Report of the ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Payment Systems
(annual Chairman's Report to American Bar Association) (June 15, 1988) (on file with Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
68. See Minutes, June 17, 1988, supra note 29, at 1; Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on
Proposed Article 4A, ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Payment Systems, in San Diego, Cal. (June
18, 1988) [hereinafter Minutes, June 18, 1988] (on file with Loyola of LosAngeles Law Review).
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the subcommittee, it was the bank's job, not the customer's, to determine
whether a security procedure was commercially reasonable. Moreover, if
funds mysteriously disappeared from a customer's account, despite the
establishment of such a procedure, the fault would obviously be the
bank's, and the bank, not the customer, should be liable for the loss. No,
said the bank attorneys, banks know how to manage money, and if funds
mysteriously disappeared, the customer would almost always be the one
at fault. On the contrary, said the cash managers, the bank would be in
control of the account, and if funds mysteriously disappeared, they were
quite sure that the bank would almost always be the one at fault. In fact,
they were so convinced of the accuracy of their analysis that, unless the
relevant provisions were changed, they were prepared to oppose adoption
of the entire Article 4A in the legislatures of all fifty states.69
This struck the bank attorneys as a persuasive argument. They pro-
ceeded, during this session and several succeeding ones, to negotiate with
the cash managers over this issue and several other provisions in Article
4A. The result, not surprisingly, was a compromise. On the mysterious
interloper issue itself, the customer would be given an opportunity to
prove that the loss was not caused by its own employee, or by someone
who obtained from the customer the means of effectuating the fraudulent
transfer. If the customer could make this demonstration-in other
words, if the interloper was truly mysterious-the loss would fall upon
the bank.70
With respect to the reasonableness of security devices, the final re-
sult ended up closer to the bank's original position. Here is the full text
of the relevant provision, section 4A-202(c) of the UCC:
(c) Commercial reasonableness of a security procedure is a
question of law to be determined by considering the wishes of
the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the
customer known to the bank, including the size, type, and fre-
quency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to
the bank, alternative security procedures offered to the cus-
tomer, and security procedures in general use by customers and
receiving banks similarly situated. A security procedure is
deemed to be commercially reasonable if (i) the security proce-
69. See Minutes, June 18, 1988, supra note 68, at 4-8. The minutes state this argument
somewhat more delicately: "Mr. Herold stated that the NCCMA could not support the stat-
ute as presently drafted." Id. at 6.
70. U.C.C. § 4A-203. Because the burden of proof is on the customer, of course, there
could be a situation in which the cause of the loss was truly unknown, but the customer could
not persuade the trier of fact that it was blameless. This simply reflects the careful balancing
of opposing interests that § 4A-203 represents.
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dure was chosen by the customer after the bank offered, and the
customer refused, a security procedure that was commercially
reasonable for that customer, and (ii) the customer expressly
agreed in writing to be bound by any payment order, whether
or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank
in compliance with the security procedure chosen by the
customer.71
This is classic lawyer's language of course, and would be readily
recognized as such by both lawyers and nonlawyers. What is most nota-
ble is that it is the language of negotiated compromise. The provision is
virtually a transcription of the point and counterpoint, the argument, ob-
jection, response and qualification that occurred during the subcommit-
tee meetings. One can almost hear the bank attorneys and the corporate
cash managers speak as one reads the provision.
Whether transcribing a negotiation of this sort produces optimal so-
cial policy is an open question. I do not think it does. It seems to me
that the interaction among opposing forces works best when it generates
new ideas, rather than qualifying existing ones.72 But at least negotia-
tions produce balance. Provisions such as this, negotiated between par-
ties of roughly equal strength, generally give each side the feeling that
their interests have been adequately protected. That is what the cash
managers felt, as well as the banks. Both sides ended up supporting Arti-
cle 4A in the state legislatures; and with no one opposing it, the statute
was rapidly adopted.
The corporate cash managers were not particularly interested in re-
vised Articles 3 and 4, which is hardly surprising: These statutes create
problems for consumers, in my view, but they work well enough for cor-
porate customers. For example, corporations, with their professional
bookkeeping staffs, will experience no particular difficulty in monitoring
a truncated account statement that contains only numbers, and they
probably would be able to persuade banks to retrieve their items for
them. In fact, the corporate cash managers identified only one significant
concern. The original Article 4 provides that the customer is expected to
review the account statement within "a reasonable period not exceeding
fourteen calendar days."173 If the customer fails to do so, it cannot shift
71. Id. § 4A-202(c).
72. See Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4,
42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 586-92 (1991).
73. U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(b) (Original). More specifically, customers generally can obtain a
recredit of any item that a bank has paid and charged to the customers' accounts by proving
that they did not sign or otherwise authorize the item. Section 4-406 provided that customers
were precluded from asserting that they had not signed the item, and thus precluded from
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liability to the bank in a case in which two frauds are committed by the
same wrongdoer. Both Mark Budnitz and I thought the fourteen-day
limit was onerous for consumers, who might be ill, on vacation, tied up
with a personal crisis, very busy at work or otherwise distracted. We
raised this concern at one subcommittee meeting, with the usual result.
74
At the very end of our subcommittee's deliberations, as the revised Arti-
cles 3 and 4 were about to be promulgated, the NCCMA discovered the
same concern-not because corporations get sick, but because they might
issue a very large volume of checks and then have difficulty reviewing the
account within fourteen days. Despite the awkward timing of this dis-
covery, there was no further need for a show of force by the NCCMA.
Two attorneys who represent the organization, Anne Pope and Paul Tur-
ner, both of whom are effective negotiators, presented the issue to the
ABA subcommittee,'7 and the subcommittee dutifully agreed to extend
the review period to thirty days.76
These interactions illustrate another aspect of the way that lawyers
think. Although they identify with their clients and construct reality
through their clients' eyes, lawyers regularly deal with opposing lawyers,
who identify in turn with their own clients and construct reality through
those opposing eyes. As a result, lawyers must know how to negotiate,
how to compromise, how to recoup their position and how to lose. In
this sense, the adversary process works the way that theory suggests. In
other fields, conflicts cannot be resolved without a commonly shared set
of criteria that establish the rules of persuasion, or without analysis or
empirical evidence that actually persuades. Where such criteria do exist,
as in many areas of natural science, the results will be more satisfying
than law. Where they do not exist, as in religion, or in areas where the
decisive evidence is not available, deadlock often results. Law, or more
correctly legal thinking, gives us a mechanism for resolving disagreement
in the absence of accepted criteria for truth. It provides, in other words,
the verbal medium of compromise.77
avoiding the charge to their accounts, if they failed to report an unauthorized signature within
14 days and then a second item, signed by the same wrongdoer, was paid by the bank.
74. See Minutes, Mar. 4, 1989, supra note 30, at 11.
75. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems, in San Diego, Cal. 19-21 (June 8-9, 1990) [hereinafter Minutes, June 8-9,
1990] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). James Kopp, of Shell Oil Company,
also spoke on behalf of corporate users. Id. at 17.
76. Id. This change was subsequently touted by the sponsors of the UCC revisions as one
of the revisions' benefits for consumers. See Article 3 prefatory note, supra note 54.
77. Cf. 1 JOROEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REA-
SON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 243-73 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).
Habermas treats law as a paradigm for normative discourse, that is, discourse that can achieve
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The bank attorneys on the ABA committee were never persuaded
that the corporate cash managers were right about the mysterious inter-
loper problem. On the other hand, when I spoke to them about it after
the issue had been resolved, and the cash managers had begun to drift
away from the committee, they expressed virtually no resentment at their
opponents' show of force. They would have done the same thing under
the circumstances, and it seemed to them not only a legitimate way to
proceed, but a substantially valid way to state a position. In an adversary
system, after all, there is no basis of decision external to the clash of
opposing arguments. To put the matter another way, the justice that
adversary systems produce is what Rawls labels "pure procedural jus-
tice."78 It emerges from the process itself, whether that process is court-
room trial or committee negotiation.
I felt bad that I could not produce equally beneficial results for con-
sumers as the cash managers had produced for corporations. But this
only illustrates another feature of the adversary system: that it only
works effectively when the two sides are represented with relative equal-
ity.7 9 In a courtroom, at least according to theory, equality requires only
competent representation, not political or economic power; indeed, that
is the normative appeal of the judicial process.80 This carries over into
nonlitigation settings; if parties are negotiating over legally enforceable
rights, that is, if they are "bargaining in the shadow of the law," the same
phenomenon will occur.8' But when the negotiation involves a matter of
political policy, when the parties are bargaining in the shadow of the
legislature, or in the shadow of an administrative agency, competent rep-
resentation is not sufficient to secure the equality that is needed for an
effective adversary process.8 2 There must be an equality of political
power. That is what only a consumer representative, and most definitely
not a law professor, can provide.
agreement among rational participants without relying on descriptive statements about the
world.
78. See Rawls, supra note 21, at 83-90.
79. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
80. See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
81. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
82. This can be called "bargaining without force of law." See Laura Nader, Disputing
Without Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979). Significantly, Nader notes that consumers
with small complaints against merchants, as opposed to the relatively equal divorcing couples
whom Mnookin and Kornhauser describe, are in the "bargaining without force of law" situa-
tion in legal cases, as well as political controversies. Id. at 109-20. The reason is that the law
is available, but it is too expensive and complex to be used for small consumer cases. Id. at
108.
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IV. PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE LAW
The proceedings of the ABA committee revealed another character-
istic feature of the lawyer's mode of thought, one that was less obvious,
but equally important, as identifying with the client or negotiating with
the opposition. This was the continued dominance of the common-law
model. A number of leading scholars, including Bruce Ackerman,
83
Philip Selznick and Philippe Nonet,84 and Richard Posner, 85 have an-
nounced the obsolescence of this traditional approach to law. I certainly
share this view,86 but I saw little support for it on the committee. Per-
haps this is merely a factor of the committee members' age, although my
own experiences with today's law students make me doubt that optimis-
tic theory. Besides, the committee members were not that old, most of
them having been in law school during the legal process era. Their atti-
tudes, however, suggested that they had received their training directly
from Christopher Columbus Langdell. 7
Most notably, the committee members were impervious to law and
economics. My article with Robert Cooter on loss allocation in the pay-
ment system 88 had employed a law and economics analysis, and many of
my comments during our committee meetings were based on this per-
spective. To say that the committee rejected these comments would be
an understatement; law and economics analysis was greeted by most of
the committee members with complete incomprehension. Some of this
may have been the result of the bank attorneys' identification with their
clients; Cooter's and my article concluded that consumers should receive
more protection than the UCC provides and I reiterated this conclusion
in my comments to the committee. But law and economics is not gener-
ally regarded as a liberal, pro-consumer approach. Had the attorneys
been prepared to think in economic terms, they easily could have con-
tested my statements; in fact, that is exactly what Roland Brandel, the
committee chair, and William Warren, the reporter, did. But the blank
stares that I received from the other members of the committee indicated
a much more profound rejection of the ideas I was proposing.
83. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984).
84. See PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: To-
WARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
85. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
86. See Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89
MICH. L. REv. 792 (1991).
87. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871).
88. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 7.
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One example involves the reporters' effort to revise Article 3's com-
plicated provisions on contributory negligence. In their early drafts,
Warren and Jordan had proposed that when both the bank and the cus-
tomer were negligent, any resulting loss should be divided evenly be-
tween them.8 9 In our subcommittee, Warren recommended this
provision because it would encourage settlement and I argued that it was
a good idea on economic grounds.90 Most check fraud cases are rela-
tively small; thus, the cost of making a precise determination of fault,
with a comparative negligence standard for example, will generally ex-
ceed any benefit to be derived from doing so. In fact, an equal division of
liability is often close to optimal because it gives each party sufficient
motivation to take precaution against loss.91 Note that this same ap-
proach can be used to solve the mysterious interloper problem; although
the amounts are large enough to remove the concern about litigation
costs, the concept of equal division makes sense when one wants to moti-
vate both parties to take increased precaution.
But the attorneys in the subcommittee could not imagine dispensing
with the principle of fault. In their view, one party was more at fault
than the other, and that party should be either entirely liable (the con-
tributory negligence principle) or liable to the extent of its fault (the com-
parative negligence principle). I tried to explain my view that the
assignment of liability was nothing but an instrumentality for allocating
loss and inducing precautions to prevent it. I also argued that there was
simply no practical way to determine liability for relatively small losses,
because litigation costs would rapidly obscure the proportional relation-
ship between the parties' liability and, indeed, could readily exceed the
amount at stake in its entirety.
I am not sure I ever received a direct answer to these arguments, but
the general tone of the responses suggested an equivalence, in the com-
89. U.C.C. § 3-405(3) (Tent. Draft 1988); U.C.C. § 4-406(4) (Tent. Draft 1988).
90. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems, in Toronto, Ont., Can. 3 (Aug. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Minutes, Aug. 8,
1988] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Minutes, June 17, 1988, supra note 29,
at 9-10; Minutes, Sept. 26, 1987, supra note 27, at 7; Minutes, Apr. 10, 1987, supra note 25, at
4; Minutes, Nov. 7, 1986, supra note 39, at 4. As this list suggests, the loss-splitting proposal
was one of the subcommittee's most heavily debated topics.
91. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 7, at 86-92. In fact, my position is that consumers
should bear only as much of the loss as is necessary to induce them to take precaution, or more
precisely, to take as much precaution as liability rules can induce them to take. This level of
loss may be as low as zero, but is certainly no more than $100. Beyond that, all losses should
be borne by the financial institution for the simple reason that the institution can spread these
losses across the entire customer base. For business customers, however, who are more likely
to enter into rational calculations about levels of precaution, an equal division may be close to
optimal. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 397-403 (1988).
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mittee members' minds, between negligent handling of a check and mur-
der. In setting the punishment for murder, we consider not only
deterrence, but also the imposition of moral blame. It would be odious to
dispense with efforts to determine responsibility in a murder case, and
simply punish fifty percent of the accused because of concerns about liti-
gation costs. The committee regarded the even division of liability in
check collection cases as equally odious.
Common law is built upon a pervasive principle of fault.92 Posner
argues that this principle yields the efficient outcome,93 but most people
reject this view.94 In any case, the relationship between fault and effi-
ciency is contingent, not intrinsic; what distinguishes common law is its
moralism. A party is liable because its behavior diverged from the ac-
cepted standard, because a "reasonable man" would have behaved differ-
ently, because the behavior, while not necessarily criminal, was wrong.
In addition, the common law is blind to litigation costs. Because liability
is regarded as a moral judgment, it occupies a different realm from purely
monetary issues like a lawyer's fee. Over the course of the last twenty
years, federal legislation in the area of payments has adopted a different
perspective, assigning liability on instrumental grounds, awarding attor-
ney's fees, and providing liquidated damages as a substitute for determi-
nations of exact amounts.95 Every lawyer on the committee was fully
conversant with these laws; at some level, however, they felt that these
statutes were illegitimate intrusions on the common law, and found the
rationale behind them incoherent.
Another indication of the committee's attitude towards law was its
lack of interest in empirical research. The reporters to6k a one-day tour
of a bank check processing facility, but they did not have the benefit of
any real data. Consequently, the drafting committee and the ABA com-
mittee were left to speculate about factual matters such as the level of
check fraud losses, the source of these losses, the frequency and reason
for stop payment orders, the frequency of bank errors in effectuating
such orders, the frequency of NSF checks, the number of NSF checks
92. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 63-129 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963)
(lectures III & IV).
93. See POSNER, supra note 85, at 25-19 1; Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
94. See, eg., KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 248-65 (1988); Robert Cooter & Lewis
Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
139, 154-56 (1980); Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics
in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307 (1979).
95. See, e.g., Expedited Funds Availability Act, § 611, 12 U.S.C. § 4010 (1988); Truth in
Lending Act, § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1988); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, § 813, 15
U.S.C. § 1692k (1988); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, § 915, 15 U.SC. § 1693m (1988).
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that could have been avoided by adopting alternative procedures, existing
consumer and corporate practices of reviewing account statements, con-
sumer preferences with respect to truncation, and a variety of other mat-
ters that were crucial to their decision-making process.
Much of this information would have been relatively easy and inex-
pensive to acquire. Indeed, a substantial amount of it already existed in
the hands of major commercial banks. They know what their level of
fraud losses are, for example, or their frequency of stop payment orders
and stop payment errors. Very often, they conduct marketing surveys to
obtain information about consumer preferences. While this information
is proprietary, and some of it is viewed as sensitive, it could have been
readily redacted and combined so that its source was obscured. Banks
were certainly eager to participate in the drafting process, and the bank-
ers on the ABA committee were prepared to volunteer informal accounts
of information available to the bank when they found it useful to do so.
It would have been quite reasonable for the sponsors to request that they
provide all the relevant information they already possessed. Other infor-
mation could have been obtained by fairly simple surveys-a few social
science graduate students, working for six months, could have increased
the amount of hard data available to the drafting committee and the
ABA committee by an order of magnitude.
There was simply no pragmatic reason not to undertake this effort.
Articles 3 and 4 were in the process of revision for some fourteen years.
To be sure, the sponsors could not have predicted that the effort would
drag on that long, but they certainly should have expected it to last more
than a year or two. By 1986, when the second drafting effort began, they
knew that the first one had taken at least seven years, and could confi-
dently predict that they would have sufficient time to gather the neces-
sary data before the second round had been completed. Some expenses
would have been involved, but given the amount of information that
banks already possessed and the relative simplicity of gathering some of
the remaining data, that expense was not particularly formidable.
It would be overly conspiratorial to assume that the sponsors
avoided empirical studies because they feared that the results would dis-
prove their bank-oriented inclinations. In all likelihood the possibility of
performing studies did not occur to them, at least not with any force,
because they were thinking in common-law terms. Common-law trials
are structured by legal doctrine and demand only the facts of the specific
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case, according to standards of relevance that the doctrine defines.
96
Judges do not base their decisions on empirical data, and they possess
neither the inclination nor the power to order studies to obtain such data.
Instead they engage in speculation, thereby preserving the impression
that the common law is a methodologically coherent system.97 To take
but one example, the original Article 4, as already discussed, provided
that the customer must review the account statement within a reasonable
time, not exceeding fourteen days, to avoid liability for repeated frauds.98
The attorney for a customer who waited until thirteen days had passed
might argue that this length of time was reasonable, because ordinary
people generally do not expect fraud; the bank would argue that it was
not reasonable, in the absence of illness or personal tragedy, because peo-
ple know that the statement is important. They typically would not con-
duct an empirical survey to determine the average length of time that
individuals wait before reviewing the account, and the judge would virtu-
ally never order such a study on his or her own. What they certainly
would not do, because it is not within the scope of the case, is perform an
empirical study to determine whether liability rules of this sort have any
effect upon the level of precaution taken by the average individual.
Whether this is good or bad practice for trying cases is an open
question. It seems to me, however, that it is not a particularly good way
to draft legislation, or to make public policy in general. I doubt that
many people would defend it; in fact, I have often heard various people,
including bank attorneys, express scorn for Congress because it legislates
on the basis of anecdotes.99 But the drafting committee and the ABA
96. Originally, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, UNIF. R. EvID. 9-12 (1953) (superseded by
UNIF. R. EVID. 201, 13A U.L.A. 60 (1986)), and the ALI (them againl) Code rules, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 801-803 (1942), permitted courts to take judicial notice of facts
only when those facts were deemed indisputable. Currently, the rules are limited to adjudica-
tive facts. See FED. R. EVID. 201. There is no rule to govern legislative facts. See 3 KEN-
NETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.1 (2d ed. 1980). In other words,
there is no set procedure for judicial factfinding outside the trial setting.
97. When judges do rely on nonlegal sources, they often do so in an unsystematic manner
that renders these sources unreliable. See Peggy C. Davis, "There is a Book Out. . . " An
Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987). Casual
citation, rather than the skilled usage of social science methodology, does not challenge the
common-law approach to decision making. It is consistent with the style of thought that
Bruce Ackerman calls "ordinary observing," rather than "scientific policymaking." BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-20 (1977).
98. U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(b) (Original); see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
99. I agree that Congress is equally guilty of this behavior, see Edward L. Rubin, Legisla-
tive Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233 (1991),
although there are signs of change, see Allen Schick, Informed Legislation: Policy Research
Versus Ordinary Knowledge, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND THE CONGRESS 99 (William H.
Robinson & Clay H. Wellsborn eds., 1991).
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committee did exactly the same thing, and I suspect for the same reason;
their thinking was shaped by the traditional patterns of common-law
adjudication, and they were unable to make the shift to a more policy-
oriented approach. Of course, to think like a lawyer does not necessarily
imply that one thinks like a common-law lawyer. But there is a certain
appealing coherence or integrity to the common law that induces law-
trained people to think that way unless they make a specific effort to
approach issues in different terms.
The traditionalism of the lawyers' approach to the law was an addi-
tional factor, over and above the committee's lack of balance, that tended
to restrict its ability to engage in effective policy making. Even when
there was a balance, as in the debate over the mysterious interloper prob-
lem, the result tended to be unimpressive-a mere division of the pie,
rather than a creative solution to the problem. This may have been due
to the absence of a guiding force. With no one who was able to persuade
the committee members to think in different terms, they tended to fall
back on established thought patterns and to produce only minor varia-
tions on preexisting ideas. Thus, they failed to realize the creative pos-
sibilities that can result from the clash of effectively presented positions.
All of this serves as but a prelude to the most controversial, and in
my view the most remarkable incident during the five years I was in-
volved with the ABA committee. The whole point of the drawn-out,
sometimes painful revision process, was to modernize Articles 3 and 4.1°°
In 1987, however, federal legislation preempted a large part of the re-
vised Article 4 rules concerning the collection of checks."' Warren, the
reporter with primary responsibility for Articles 3 and 4, readily ac-
knowledged this and concluded that the remaining collection rules be
federalized as well. After extensive discussion, including its only formal
vote on a specific issue, the subcommittee concluded that the remaining
collection rules should remain part of a uniform state law and that-this
being the remarkable part-the preempted provisions also should be re-
tained, for enactment as uniform state law. That came to pass, so that
today, with the ABA's sage advice, the UCC sponsors have enacted an
elaborate, shiny-new statute that is already out of date.
The details, while a bit complex, are illuminating. Article 4 is
designed around a rather conceptual distinction between provisional and
final payment. When a check is collected, each person who receives the
check gives a provisional credit to the person presenting it. Thus, in the
100. See Memorandum from William D. Warren & Robert L. Jordan, supra note 36.
101. See infra notes 107-12.
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paradigmatic transaction, a provisional credit is given to the payee by the
depositary bank, to the depositary bank by the intermediary bank, and to
the intermediary bank by the drawee or payor bank.10 2 These credits are
provisional because they can be reversed. Examples of legitimate
grounds for reversal include insufficient funds, a stop order, an interven-
ing legal claim or suspected fraud.
10 3
It is crucial to the efficiency of the checking system to assume that
checks are properly payable, so that the drawee bank's obligation is to
communicate only negative information in the event that it will not pay
the check. Consequently, the provisional credit must become a final, or
irreversible credit, usable as current funds, by the mere passage of time.
This time is set by Article 4, and is known as the drawee bank's midnight
deadline-that is, midnight of the business day after the day the bank
received the check."° At that magic moment, all provisional credits in
the intermediary and depositary banks become final. 10 5 To reject a
check, and thus prevent the finalization of these provisional credits, the
drawee bank must return the check to the intermediary bank before its
midnight deadline. The intermediary bank must then return the check to
its transferor, either a prior intermediary bank or the depositary bank, by
its midnight deadline. In other words, provisional credits become final
credits by the drawee bank's midnight deadline unless the check retraces
its path through the collection chain, flipping all the switches that were
presumptively thrown when the check made its forward journey. 106
In 1987, as a result of intense pressure from consumer interests,
Congress passed the Expedited Funds Availability Act.10 7 The primary
purpose of this legislation was to compel banks to make funds available
102. See U.C.C. §§ 4-202, -212 to -213, -301 to -302 (Original).
103. In fact, the payor bank has the power to refuse payment for any reason, see U.C.C.
§ 3-409 (Original), U.C.C. § 3-408 (Revised), without liability to the presenting bank or the
depositary bank. If it does so wrongfully, however, it will be liable to its own customer under
U.C.C. § 4-402 (Original & Revised).
104. U.C.C. §§ 4-301 to -302 (Original & Revised).
105. For more detailed explanations, see FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE
LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND NoTEs 8-21 to -39 (1992); Fairfax Leary, Jr.,
Check Handling Under Article Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 331,
361 (1965).
106. U.C.C. § 4-212(2) (Original) did provide for direct return of a dishonored check to the
depositary bank as an alternative, but it placed this section in brackets, and explained in a note:
"Direct returns is recognized as an innovation that is not yet established bank practice ..
U.C.C. § 4-212(2) (Original).
107. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 635 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-
4010 (1988)). For a general description of the Act, see Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin,
Orders and Incentives as Regulatory Methods: The Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987,
35 UCLA L. REv. 1115 (1988).
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to bank customers within a specified time after they deposited a check at
their bank. In doing so, however, the Act created a problem. The depos-
itary bank might be required to make funds available-that is, allow
them to be withdrawn-before it had time to learn that the check had
been dishonored. The possibilities for fraud are apparent. To reduce
them, the Federal Reserve Board, which was charged with implementing
the Act, included rules for expediting the return of checks in its imple-
menting regulation, designated Regulation CC. 10 These rules would en-
able a dishonored check, it was hoped, to reach the depositary bank
before that bank was required to make the funds available to the
depositor.
Regulation CC is considerably longer and, if possible, even more
complex than Article 4. It contains a number of provisions for expedit-
ing the return of checks, but one of the basic provisions is that a check no
longer needs to retrace its path through the collection chain.109 Instead,
it can be returned by the most expeditious means available. Two meth-
ods that are specifically mentioned are: (1) direct return to the deposi-
tary bank; and (2) return via the Federal Reserve System. 10 Rather than
reversing its provisional credit to the bank that presented the check, the
drawee bank would receive a credit directly from the depositary bank, or
from the Fed-which would then return the check to the depositary and
receive a credit for itself.1"1 The depositary bank, of course, would then
make itself whole by reversing its provisional credit to the depositor.
Regulation CC was promulgated on May 27, 1988, with an effective
date of September 1, 1988.112 Apparently Warren and Jordan quickly
realized that it preempted a substantial part of Article 4, even in its re-
vised form. Most significantly, Regulation CC displaced the entire con-
ceptual structure of Article 4. If the check no longer needed to retrace
its path down the collection chain when it was dishonored, then there
was no longer any distinction between provisional and final credits.
There was just one type of credit, to be given at each stage of the process,
108. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1992). For general descriptions of Regulation CC, see BARKLEY
CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, REGULATION CC: FUNDS AVAILABILITY AND CHECK COLLEC-
TION (1988); Lynn B. Barr, Regulation CC: Expedited Funds Availability, 43 Bus. LAw. 1585
(1988).
109. 12 C.F.R. §§ 229.30-.32.
110. Id, §§ 229.30-.31.
111. Id. § 229.32.
112. 53 Fed. Reg. 19,372 (1988) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 229 (1992)). The regulation
included additional provisions that would go into effect on September 1, 1990. See Barr, supra
note 108, at 1585.
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and then a separate process, with its own succession of credits, to be
given when the check was returned.'
1 3
In response to this development, Warren and Jordan explored vari-
ous ways to adjust their revisions of Articles 3 and 4 to conform with
Regulation CC. After about two years at this task, they concluded, with
characteristic intellectual honesty, that the best solution was to abandon
the attempt and allow federal law to govern the entire check collection
process. This would involve a further expansion of Regulation CC, and
would relegate the Article 4 collection rules to governing the relatively
minor area of noncash items, such as documentary drafts. Warren re-
ported this conclusion to our subcommittee in January 1990.114
The possible federalization of the check collection rules was by far
the most important issue that the subcommittee faced. As will be recal-
led, the ABA committee was assigned the task of commenting on a pro-
ject whose parameters were already set by the ALI and NCCUSL; this
was its only opportunity to review the project's basic premises. More-
over, federalization was the one issue on which the ABA committee
could have spoken directly to policy makers, rather than simply making
recommendations to the ABA. Oliver Ireland, Associate General Coun-
sel to the Fed's Board of Governors, indicated to us that the Federal
Reserve System was willing to regulate the entire subject of interbank
collections, but was not necessarily eager to do so, and certainly would
not undertake that role unless there was broad agreement from the bank-
ing community.I' That was one community-perhaps the only commu-
nity-whose views our committee was in a good position to report.
When the issue was raised directly with the committee, it produced
a unique dispersion of views among the members, and a consequently
animated discussion. A number of the bank attorneys, including Roland
Brandel, the chair of the committee, and David Goldstein, the Seattle
lawyer who had urged his colleagues to compromise on the stop payment
issue,116 spoke strongly in favor of federalization. Other bank attorneys,
including Thomas Montgomery, Assistant General Counsel of the Bank
of America, and Gerard Milano, Executive Director of the California
Bankers Clearing House, expressed reservations. When we took a pre-
113. See MILLER & HARRELL, supra note 105, at 8-93 to -95.
114. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems, in S.F., Cal. 9 (Jan. 12-13, 1990) [hereinafter Minutes, Jan. 12-13, 1990]
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). The issue had been discussed by the subcom-
mittee at several previous meetings. Minutes, June 17, 1988, supra note 29, at 2-3; Minutes,
Sept. 26, 1987, supra note 27, at 2-4.
115. See Minutes, Jan. 12-13, 1990, supra note 114, at 9.
116. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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liminary vote, twenty-eight members favored federalization of all check
collection rules, none were opposed, and four abstained. As to whether
Article 4 should be left unchanged as a "safety net" to cover possible
revocation of Regulation CC, or substantially rewritten as a statute gov-
erning the collection of noncash items, fourteen voted in favor of rewrit-
ing Article 4, and five committee members voted against it. Because
most of the subcommittee members felt unsure of their positions, I sug-
gested, from the chair, that I write up a brief statement of the reasons for
federalization 117 and circulate it to the entire committee, with a ballot for
the members to indicate approval or disapproval of the two proposals. 18
The statement, drafted with the help of Brandel, Goldstein, Anne
Pope and Paul Turner-the latter two being the attorneys who were rep-
resenting the National Corporate Cash Managers Association-
advanced four principal arguments: (1) All the rules for check collection
should be in one place and that place could only be Regulation CC; (2) a
federal regulation is much easier to change, and thus more flexible, than
a uniform state law; (3) a federal regulation could be uniformly and effec-
tively enforced by the Federal Reserve System; and (4) the remainder of
Article 4 could be drafted as a coherent statute. 19 I soon learned that
resistance to this idea was developing, particularly among California
banks. Of the twenty-one ballots returned, twelve favored the proposals,
while nine opposed them. 2 Several of the opposing ballots included ex-
tensive memoranda, which were ultimately consolidated into a single
document authored by Thomas Montgomery, Patricia Fry, a professor at
the University of North Dakota, and Robert Ballen, a law partner of
Brandel. The major points of this document were: (1) "The state legisla-
tive process regarding the check collection system has served the nation
well for over two centuries";121 (2) banks need stability and uniform state
laws are less subject to change than a federal regulation;122 (3) federal
regulation of the collection process may lead to federal regulation of
bank-customer relations, a matter in which local variations are impor-
117. See Minutes, Jan. 12-13, 1990, supra note 114, at 21.
118. Memorandum from William Davenport et al. to Members of the ABA Ad Hoe Com-
mittee on Payment Systems 3 (Feb. 5, 1990) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
119. See Edward L. Rubin et al., Report on the Relationship of UCC Article 4 and Federal
Reserve Board Regulation CC 3-7 (1990) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
120. Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee on
Payment Systems, in Boston, Mass. (Apr. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Minutes, Apr. 7, 1990] (on file
with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
121. Memorandum of Robert Ballen et al. 1 (May 10, 1990) (on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review).
122. Id. at 2.
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tant; 23 (4) the Article 4 revisions are the result of a careful, deliberative
process-"by representatives of banks, their customers, the Federal Re-
serve Board, Federal Reserve Banks, legal experts in the commercial law
field, and the Uniform Law Commissioners serving on the Drafting
Committee,"1 24 whereas one organization, the Federal Reserve Board,
"has unrestricted power with respect to the promulgation of regulations
affecting the nation's check collection system";1 2' and (5) federalization
"is a manifestation of a broader trend toward 'leaving it to the ex-
perts' "126 rather than allowing the political process to work.1
27
Notably, these comments are self-contradictory, favoring both sta-
bility and local variation, or favoring drafting committee expertise but
opposing Federal Reserve expertise. But a noticeable theme runs
through these disparate objections: their attitude of simultaneous rever-
ence for state law and distaste for the federal administrative process. Be-
hind this is the dominance of common law in the mental processes of
lawyers. The UCC, being a statute, is not exactly common law-there is
very little pure common law these days-but it is very close. Article 3 is
a light revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which, like the Brit-
ish Bills of Exchange Act that inspired it, codifies the common law as it
existed at the time.1 28 Article 4 has no such antecedents, but its concep-
tual structure is allied to Article 3's, and ultimately to the common-law
approach to legal rules. To take just one example, the finalization of
provisional credits by passage of the midnight deadline is not described
as a finalization at all; rather, Article 4 states that the payor bank be-
comes "accountable for the amount of"' 129 the item, a rather bizarre as-
similation of the standard mechanism for paying checks into common-
law rules for allocating losses.' 30 Even more significantly, both articles
rely entirely on private litigation to implement their provisions, and thus
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2-3.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id at 4.
127. Id.
128. For a discussion of this background, see Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of
Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 456-61 (1979); Lary Lawrence, Miscon-
ceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Suggested Methodology and
Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C. L. Rv. 115, 115-18 (1983); and Rubin, supra note 72, at 552-60.
129. U.C.C. § 4-302(a) (Original & Revised).
130. Notably, the revision retained this counter-intuitive usage. Regulation CC has no par-
allel provision because it does not cover forward collection. A closely allied provision regard-
ing the return of checks begins as follows: "If a paying bank determines not to pay a check, it
shall return the check in an expeditious manner .. " 12 C.F.R. § 229.30(a) (1992).
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employ dispute resolution by a nonspecialist, common-law-oriented
judge as their sole enforcement mechanism.
Regulation CC, the alternative means of governing check collection,
has an entirely different feel to it. Its rules are stated in technical lan-
guage, with specific references to current bank operations, not as general
principles, and certainly not as allocations of liability. It is designed to
be actively enforced by a regulatory agency that has direct supervisory
authority over the check collection system, and a formidable operational
presence as the largest participant in that system. It can be adapted to
rather small scale changes in technology by administrative interpretation
or by a fairly simple process of revision. To someone who thinks in
common-law terms, Regulation CC looks foreign and unsettling-the
product of intrusive, undemocratic experts rather than wise, legally-
trained nonexperts; it is simultaneously a source of ever varying adminis-
trative policy and a suppression of healthy local variation.
The common-law model encourages us to think of the law as pos-
sessing integrity, a wonderfully versatile term that suggests both intellec-
tual coherence and moral righteousness. Intellectually, the common law
is depicted as various embodiments of general principles, forming a uni-
fied whole. When Ronald Dworkin, our leading contemporary
enthusiast for common law,"'1 speaks of integrity, this is essentially what
he means. Morally, the common law is the application of intuitive judg-
ments about right and wrong behavior in a wide variety of situations; it is
a compendium of hundreds of thousands of little morality plays about
the vicissitudes of ordinary existence. Regulation CC has no such integ-
rity; it is an industry-specific, situation-specific set of detailed instruc-
tions, entirely bereft of moral overtones. To consign the rules for check
collection to this administrative purgatory struck many members of the
subcommittee as offensive. They preferred promulgating a well-
formulated, familiar-looking statute, brimming with integrity, even if
much of it was inoperative and obsolete from the moment of its
promulgation.
Perhaps some of the opposition to federalizing check collection was
political; bank attorneys may have felt that they could control the state
law process more effectively than they could control the formidable Fed.
But that cannot be a complete explanation because federalization pro-
duced a split among the bank attorneys on the subcommittee that was
not duplicated on any other major issue. This is not difficult to under-
stand; complete control of a statute that is only partially operative is not
131. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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necessarily superior to partial control of a statute that is completely oper-
ative. Moreover, the Fed evinced no particular opposition to the banks'
position regarding check collection and seemed willing to be guided by
their judgment on most issues. Indeed, it is not clear that there were any
opposing positions; the collection process does not implicate consumer
issues, and the most churlish member of the subcommittee, namely, me,
expressed no views on collection that were not shared by a significant
number of the bank attorneys. The source of the opposition of "Fed"-
eralization seems to have been the abiding belief that real law, or proper
law, should follow the common-law model.
The federalization issue was never resolved by the subcommittee.
By the summer of 1990, the drafting committee felt it had completed its
work, and the NCCUSL had indicated its approval of the proposed revi-
sions. 132 Thus, it was time for the ABA committee to vote on its
recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates. The proposed recom-
mendation was to approve the revisions to Articles 3 and 4, and to in-
clude an accompanying document indicating the arguments for and
against federalization. 133 Ballots due September 1 were sent by mail to
all committee members. 134 Not surprisingly, the result was an over-
whelming approval of the revisions; indeed, out of 38 ballots cast, there
were only five negative votes.1 35 One of the negative votes was Gail Hil-
lebrand's, and it was accompanied by a lengthy letter stating Consumers
Union's objections. 136 This was answered by an equally substantial
memorandum, written by Roland Brandel and William Davenport,
which responded to these objections point-by-point. 37 It was a much
more serious treatment of consumer issues than anything I had even
managed to elicit, and once again indicated the need for including organ-
132. See Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee,
in Chicago, Ill. 2 (Aug. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Minutes, Aug. 4, 1990] (on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review). NCCUSL approved the revisions in July of 1990.
133. See Minutes, June 8-9, 1990, supra note 75, at 23.
134. See Memorandum from William Davenport et al. to Members of the ABA Ad Hoc
Committee on Payment Systems 2 (July 25, 1990) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
135. See Memorandum from William Davenport & Roland Brandel to Members of Ad Hoc
Committee on Payment Systems 1 (Nov. 6, 1990) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
136. Letter from Consumers Union to NCCUSL & ALI (Aug. 10, 1990) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). For another presentation of Hillebrand's views, see Gail
K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Consumer Per-
spective, 42 ALA. L. Rav. 679 (1991).
137. Memorandum in Response to Letters of Consumers Union to NCCUSL-ALI from
Roland Brandel & William Davenport to Members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Payment
Systems (Oct. 3, 1990) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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ized consumer groups in legislative projects of this sort. Hillebrand did
not persuade anyone, however, and the committee's recommendation
went forward as proposed. 138 The ABA House of Delegates approved
the revisions, without reference to the federalization issue, on February
12, 1991.139
Having recommended a partially preempted statute to the House of
Delegates, the ABA committee experienced an attack of conscience, and
began exploring the possibility of drafting a further revision of Article 4
to make that now-beatified statute conform with the prevailing federal
law. In the summer of 1991, the committee circulated a memorandum
outlining fourteen major changes, involving fifteen separate sections of
Article 4 that would be required."4 By this point, however, the NC-
CUSL was tired of check collection and indicated that it would not spon-
sor any further revisions. This dampened the committee's initial
enthusiasm for the idea; as far as I am aware, the proposal died, and the
ABA decided not to bother with the effort to make Article 4 consistent
with the law.
V. ACTING LIKE A LOBBYIST
It did not seem appropriate for me to lead the subcommittee when
my views diverged so markedly from those of the members, so I resigned
my position as chair in November of 1990.141 Although I remained a
member of the subcommittee, I lost track of its activities. I happened to
be in Washington, D.C., the following April, however, at the same time
that the committee was meeting in Colonial Williamsburg, and I decided
to drive down for the day to see how things were progressing. The meet-
ing itself was brief, consisting primarily of a report that several states had
already adopted the revisions, or were about to do so.'42 Some of the
senior members showed me the room where "it" took place--"it," of
138. See Report of the ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Payments Systems to the Officers and
Council of the Section on Business Law Regarding the Proposed Amendments to Articles 3
and 4 of the U.C.C. (Nov. 6, 1990) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
139. Memorandum from William Davenport to Members of the ABA Ad Hoc Committee
on Payment Systems (Mar. 6, 1991) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
140. Memorandum from William Davenport to Members of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Payment Systems (July 1991) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (regarding poll
on proposed new Article 4 project for NCCUSL-ALI Drafting Committee).
141. See Letter from Edward L. Rubin to William Davenport (Nov. 26, 1990) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
142. In the revised version, the comments to U.C.C. §§ 4-204, -207, -214, -301 to -302
explicitly acknowledge preemption by Regulation CC. Minutes of Meeting, Subcommittee on
Articles 3 and 4, ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Payment Systems, in Williamsburg, Va. (Apr.
13, 1991) [hereinafter Minutes, Apr. 13, 1991] (on file with Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
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course, being the meeting where Hal Scott's New Payments Code was
assassinated.
One other thing I learned at the meeting was that Consumers Union
had abandoned its opposition to the Article 3 and 4 revisions, at least in
California. Its principal concern had been the preservation of a well-
known California Supreme Court decision, Perdue v. Crocker National
Bank, 143 which held that a bank's bounced check charges could be void
as unconscionable. Gail Hillebrand negotiated with the drafting commit-
tee for a favorable reference to this case in the official comment to section
4-401. The comment, worded as carefully as a provision in the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty, did not express approval of the case.'" It sim-
ply stated that Article 4 "does not regulate fees that banks charge their
customers," but that "courts have reviewed fees and the bank's exercise
of a discretion to set fees," citing Perdue and one other case.145 This was
not a large concession, but it seemed to me that it was the best that could
be accomplished under the circumstances.
One month later, I was scheduled to go to Sacramento to testify
before a committee of the California Legislature on a consumer protec-
tion bill, when I noted that the Article 3 and 4 revisions were being con-
sidered by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the very day I would be
there. I quickly sent a letter of opposition to the legislative staff, 146 and
appeared before the committee on May 21, 1991. In my testimony, I
concentrated on loss allocation issues, but I also addressed NSF checks
and check truncation. 47 The committee members were particularly
struck by the truncation provisions and the lack of accompanying protec-
tions for customers. My impression was that they had no idea what the
revisions contained. Apparently, the legislature assumed the bill was
good legislation because it was introduced under the auspices of the ALI
and the NCCUSL, and was sponsored by one of California's most
respected state senators, Robert Beverly.' 48 Had I not testified, it proba-
bly would have been placed on the "Consent Calendar" and passed with-
out discussion. After being made aware of the potential problem with
the bill, however, the Senators tabled it pending further analysis.
143. 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986); see Minutes, Apr. 13, 1991, supra note 142.
144. See U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt. 3 (Revised).
145. Id.
146. Letter from Edward L. Rubin to Gene Wong, Senate Judiciary Committee (May 17,
1991) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
147. Text of Testimony of Edward L. Rubin to Senate Judiciary Committee (May 21, 1991)
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
148. Senator Beverly introduced the revision on March 7, 1991, as Senate bill 833.
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Rather than proceeding with the Senate process, the proponents in-
troduced the Article 3 and 4 revisions in the California Assembly. The
proponents, led by the California Bankers Association, were now very
well organized; my sense was that they had lobbied the committee quite
extensively, although I had no way of knowing, and certainly no time or
resources to lobby on my own. The Assembly Committee approved the
revisions and, two months later, the bill went to a Senate-Assembly Staff
Conference.
I attended this conference as the sole opponent of the legislation.
Gail Hillebrand also attended, but was bound by her pledge of neutrality.
Four representatives of the proponent groups were present, including one
of the reporters, Robert Jordan, the President of NCCUSL, Carlyle
Ring, and a representative of the California Bankers Association, Neil
Martin. Their position, in essence, was that no one opposed the legisla-
tion except me, which was essentially true. If the legislature had con-
cerns about consumer protection, they pointed out, it should enact a
separate statute rather than disrupting the uniformity of the UCC; a
pointed question from Hillebrand, however, about whether the California
Bankers Association would support consumer legislation of this sort,
drew an inconclusive response. In the end, the legislative staff members
decided to recommend approval of Article 4 with a seven-to-ten year
sunset provision for check truncation and a few minor changes to the loss
allocation rules.
The proponents of the revisions, however, were not satisfied with
this result. Apparently, they wanted complete uniformity and were con-
cerned that any violation of that principle, however slight, would have
repercussions in other states. Thus, the bill remained on hold for one
year. In the summer of 1992, a Senate-Assembly Conference Committee
was convened and approved Article 4.149 There was enough concern
among the legislators, however, to produce several changes in the text.
Banks were required to provide two copies of checks free of charge in
each statement period. A five-year sunset feature was added to the provi-
sion specifying that banks could report only the item number, amount
and rate of payment for truncated items. The word "substantially" was
eliminated as a modifier for the bank's contribution to the loss in the
comparative negligence provisions in section 4-406, and in the loss shift-
149. Act of Sept. 25, 1992, ch. 914, 1992 Cal. Stat. 9290 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of CAL. COM. CODE).
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ing provisions of sections 3-404, 3-405 and 3-406, and several changes
were made to the official comments.
150
Although the ultimate result of my efforts in California was some-
what meager, I had been struck by the total lack of attention that unop-
posed bills seem to receive in state legislatures, and I quickly wrote a
letter to the legislatures of all the states that had not yet enacted the
revisions-so far as I could determine. Most of these letters seem to have
been lost, but I tried to keep track of legislative developments in the
states and write follow-up letters when the revisions came to the atten-
tion of the legislators. My letters produced some results, again because
the legislators were apparently unaware of the bill's provisions until a
letter of opposition arrived. In Michigan, the bill was withdrawn from
the floor of the House of Representatives, after having been passed by the
Senate, for further consideration;15 1 in Washington State, the House Fi-
nancial Institutions and Insurance Committee refused to approve the bill
without further study."' Colorado rejected the revisions, 5 3 largely
through the effort of Neil Littlefield, a professor at the University of Den-
ver, and so did West Virginia,154 largely through the effort of David Mc-
Mahon, of West Virginia Legal Services Plan, Inc. In several other
states, including New Jersey, New York and Texas, my letter reached
study commissions to which the legislature had initially referred the bill.
In still others, it vanished or was ignored, and the revisions sailed
through the legislature.
Throughout the process, the ALI and NCCUSL adopted the same
stance. If I did not manage to attract the attention of anyone in the
legislature, they would simply present the revisions as an uncontested
bill. I was never once informed by either organization that the revisions
were being introduced or considered in any state. If I did manage to
bring consumer concerns to someone's attention, the ALI and NCCUSL
would respond with a fairly massive lobbying campaign, often spear-
headed by the Bankers Association of the state. Lengthy documents
were prepared, representatives of various organizations flew to the state
capitol, and individual meetings with state legislators were held. Con-
150. See Memorandum from Gail Hillebrand to Persons Interested in Articles 3 and 4, at 2
(Sept. 9, 1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
151. See S. 457, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1991), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
STTRCK file.
152. See H. 1014, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1993), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
STTRCK file.
153. S. 13, 58th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1992).
154. See H. 2353, 70th Leg., 2d Sess. (W. Va. 1992), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
STTRCK file.
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sumers Union was described as endorsing the revisions, and Hillebrand
had to write to several state legislatures explaining her actual position.' 55
Needless to say, I lacked the resources to counterbalance all, or in-
deed any, of this heavy lobbying artillery. I was unable to travel to any
state legislature except Washington's, where I happened to have taken a
family vacation. I also was unable to keep track of legislation as it
moved through the various state legislatures, and I certainly could not
lobby individual legislators.
None of this is surprising of course. ALI and NCCUSL behaved
exactly the way any American organization behaves when it is trying to
get legislation passed. When they could get their bill through without
anyone opposing it, or even noticing it, they took advantage of that op-
portunity. When they faced opposition, they responded by trying to
overwhelm that opposition or by using allies, like the various Bankers
Associations, to put political pressure on the legislators. Nor is it sur-
prising that I was unable to respond in kind. Lobbying legislatures is a
game played by organizations, and there is no way for an individual to
participate unless he is H. Ross Perot.
But the fact that the ALI and NCCUSL played the game like ordi-
nary lobbyists is in itself worth noting. They are, after all, not interested
parties but organizations that purport to represent the public interest.
They claim legitimacy for their legislative products not only on grounds
of expertise, but also on grounds of the democratic process-that their
products have been enacted by the various state legislatures. Yet they
made no effort to educate the legislators, to acknowledge the disadvan-
tages of their proposals, or to encourage outsiders to participate. In-
stead, they did what any advocacy group does-they used every
legitimate method to ram through the legislation.
There is an interesting relationship between this sort of lobbying and
the thought processes, described above, that characterize lawyers. Lob-
byists, like lawyers, are agents who represent a client and, like lawyers,
develop an identification with their client. In some cases, unlike most
attorneys, they were originally a member of the client group but even if
not, they quickly came to see the world through their clients' eyes. Thus
lobbyists, like lawyers, will tend to be deeply committed to the views of
those they generally represent, if not by conscious choice, by long-
established patterns of thought.
155. See, e.g., Letter from Gail Hillebrand to Hon. Dennis Deliwo, Representative, Wash-
ington (Feb. 11, 1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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The legislative system, like the adversary system, works-when it
does work-because of the balance between opposing forces. In the ad-
versary system, each side comes before the court with its own advocate,
presenting its own views; the judge or jury then decides between them on
the basis of the law. The adversary system also allows for negotiation
rather than litigation; here the two adversaries meet and compromise
their position "in the shadow" of the legal decision that would result if
they were to resort to litigation. In the legislative system, each side
makes its presentation to the legislature by means of letters, testimony
and individual meetings. An advocate, in this case a lobbyist, represents
each side and presents its views; the legislature then decides between
them, it is hoped, on public policy grounds. This system also allows for
negotiation; legislatures will often enact any law on which the two oppos-
ing forces have been able to agree. Recent federal legislation legitimizes
and routinizes this negotiation process with respect to administrative reg-
ulations-a form of legislation, of course. 156 The rationale here, as in the
case of legislation itself, is that the parties are bargaining in the shadow
of public policy.
In the final analysis, acting like a lobbyist is not just similar to think-
ing like a lawyer; it is thinking like a lawyer. The only difference is that
lobbying occurs in the policymaking process, not in the adjudicatory pro-
cess. But lobbying is nothing more than the transposition of the adver-
sary model to that policymaking process, and the differences between
traditional lobbying and, traditional lawyering are almost entirely attribu-
table to the different settings in ,which they occur.
The ongoing commitment to the common-law model that I observed
among the members of the subcommittee also corresponds directly to an
aspect of the lobbying process. Lobbying, by definition, being directed
toward legislation, would seem quite remote from the common law. The
link between the two springs from the limitations that the adversarial
approach imposes on the adjudicatory and legislative processes. In adju-
dication, the adversary system produces an artificial restriction on fact-
156. See generally ALBERT P. MELONE, LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS (1977) (applying social science techniques to examine role of lawyers in
shaping laws, and concluding that American Bar Association exerts extraordinary influence on
behalf of business interests); LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS (1963)
(discussing lobbying and its relation to government); NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY
ELDER, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING, AND POLICYMAKING (1978) (examining role of inter-
est groups in American political process and factors that enable interest groups to organize,
persist and attain goals); KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER, THE LOBBYISTS: THE ART AND BUSINESS
OF INFLUENCING LAWMAKERS (1951) (tracing history of lobbying and discussing its impor-
tance in democratic legislative process).
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gathering, a tendency to reach decisions by weighing the opposing argu-
ments, and an emphasis on dispute resolution as a means of structuring
the legal system. In legislation, that same adversarial system yields simi-
lar results. Facts tend to be limited to those that the opposing parties
present; while there is obviously not the same prohibition against non-
party fact-gathering, there is a pragmatic difficulty in doing so, particu-
larly for understaffed state legislatures. Similarly, legislatures tend to
regard the decision-making process as one of choosing between opposing
sides. This becomes particularly apparent from the willingness of legisla-
tures to accept statutes that have been produced by negotiation between
these opposing sides, or that are submitted without opposition.
Finally, just as the adversary system generates a certain traditional-
ism, a commitment to the common law in the adjudicatory area, it gener-
ates an equivalent traditionalism in policymaking. When two parties are
competing for the favor of the legislature, they will want to submit a
proposal that looks familiar, and will not want to be adventuresome.
While legislation does not aspire to the same integrity as common law, it
does bear the imprint of inherited conceptions about statutes. These con-
ceptions are not necessarily useful anymore, but lobbyists are unlikely to
devise alternatives, and legislators will not do so either, as long as they
rely on lobbyists to design legislation.
Opinions will vary about whether these adversarial patterns are de-
trimental to good social decision making. One thing is clear, however: If
the adversary process is employed, those who employ it must be scrupu-
lous about ensuring that all relevant interests are represented. In the
absence of a representative, no one will speak for that interest, because all
the other participants are committed to, and indeed conditioned by, their
own perspective. To derive a proper rule or policy from the clash of
opposing forces seems to be a questionable strategy, but it does not even
offer the possibility of good results if the opposing forces are not present.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the process of drafting and enacting the revisions of Articles 3
and 4, however, one of the major forces was not present. Banks were
well represented; corporate users were represented intermittently; but
consumers were virtually unrepresented. The result was that the banking
industry and its attorneys dominated the entire process, save for a few
brief interludes. This domination was amplified by the fact that the rep-
resentatives involved were lawyers, with their characteristic tendency to
bond with their client group.
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The banking industry is entitled to be represented, of course, and it
can be expected to lobby assiduously for its positions. But the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws should not lend their names to the bankers' enterprise.
When they do, as occurred with the Article 3 and 4 revisions, they give
the banking industry the ability to clothe itself with public policy, and to
overwhelm most state legislatures with a false aura of public-oriented
impartiality. This was a disgrace. If the ALI and NCCUSL cannot do
better under their present structure, both organizations should be exten-
sively reformed or entirely abolished.
